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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                    
No. 05-5467
___________
JONATHAN M. MOORE,
                          Appellant
v.
WARDEN SCOTT DODRILL
_____________________
Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 03-cv-02168)
District Judge:  Honorable John E. Jones, III
________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action   Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 2, 2006
Before:  RENDELL, AMBRO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Filed June 19, 2006)
______________
 OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
PER CURIAM
Jonathan M. Moore appeals from an order denying his petition for writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  The District Court denied the petition on the
merits.  Because the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the petition, we will
    1  At the time the petition was filed, Moore was incarcerated at USP-Lewisburg in
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.  He has since been transferred to USP-McCreary in Pine Knot,
Kentucky.  
    2 In Bailey, the Supreme Court stated that a defendant could not be convicted of
“using” a firearm under § 924(c) unless he actively employs the firearm.  516 U.S. at 143. 
Bailey was decided after Moore’s § 2255 motion was adjudicated and is retroactively
applied to cases on collateral review.  See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998).
    3 After deciding that it had jurisdiction to consider the petition, the District Court 
transferred the case to the Northern District of Ohio.  However, the Northern District of
Ohio subsequently transferred the case back to the Middle District.
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vacate the District Court’s order and remand the matter so that the District Court can
dismiss the petition.    
In 1993, Moore pled guilty in the Northern District of Ohio to bank robbery
and violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c).  Section 924(c) makes it a crime for any person who
uses or carries a firearm during and in relation to any crime of violence.  The indictment
charged Moore under both the using and carrying prongs of § 924(c).  After Moore
withdrew his direct appeal, he filed a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  The District Court denied the motion, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed.
In December 2003, Moore filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, attempting to challenge his conviction under § 924(c).1 
Moore contends that he did not use the firearm within the meaning of the statute pursuant
to Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137 (1995).2  The District Court found that it had
jurisdiction to consider the petition.3  Subsequently, Moore moved to amend his petition
    4   Our review is plenary over the District Court’s legal conclusions and clearly
erroneous as to its factual findings.  See Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 512, (3d
Cir. 1998).  The standard of review over a denial of a motion to amend is abuse of
discretion.  See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)(citations omitted). 
Summary action is warranted when no substantial question is presented by the appeal. 
See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 539 (3d Cir. 2002)(per curiam).
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to add a claim that his sentence was unconstitutional pursuant to United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005).  The District Court denied Moore’s § 2241 petition on the merits
and denied his motion to amend the petition.  Moore timely filed a notice of appeal.4
 A federal prisoner’s challenge to the legality of his sentence and conviction
must be raised in a § 2255 motion, except where the remedy under § 2255 would be
inadequate or ineffective.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2255; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d
Cir. 1997); see also Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F. 3d 536, 538 (3d Cir.
2002)(per curiam)(stating a § 2241 habeas petition cannot be entertained by the court
unless a § 2255 motion would be inadequate or ineffective).  A § 2255 motion is
inadequate or ineffective only where the petitioner demonstrates some limitation in scope
or procedure which would prevent a § 2255 proceeding from affording him a full
adjudication on his wrongful detention claim.  See Cradle, 290 F.3d at 538 (citations
omitted).   Section 2255 is ineffective or inadequate where a petitioner is in the unusual
position of having no prior opportunity to challenge his conviction for a crime that an
intervening change in substantive law could negate with retroactive application.  See
Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Relying on Dorsainvil, Moore argues that § 2255 is inadequate or
    5 Additionally, Moore has not shown that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to
consider the Booker claim raised in his motion to amend the § 2241 petition.  We also
note that the rule announced in Booker does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral
review.  See Lloyd v. United States, 407 F.3d 608, 615-16 (3d Cir. 2005); Humphress v.
United States, 398 F.3d 855, 860 (6th Cir. 2005).
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ineffective to consider his Bailey claim.  In Dorsainvil, this Court stated that the petitioner
could bring a Bailey claim under § 2241 because he did not have the opportunity to
challenge his conviction under § 2255 for a crime that Bailey subsequently negated.  See
119 F.3d 245.  Under the current circumstances however, Moore’s reliance on Dorsainvil
is misplaced.  Bailey did not implicate the “carrying” prong of § 924(c).  See United
States v. Eyer, 113 F.3d 470, 475-76 (3d Cir. 1997)(noting that Bailey is not implicated
where petitioner was clearly convicted of carrying a firearm).    As previously noted,
Moore pled guilty to both “using” and “carrying” a firearm in violation of § 924(c). 
Moore’s Bailey claim does not fall under the Dorsainvil exception because he has not
shown that there has been an intervening change in substantive law that negated the
criminal nature for which he pled guilty (i.e., carrying a firearm during and in relation to a
crime of violence).  See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998)(detailing what
constitutes carrying under § 924(c)).  Therefore, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to
consider the § 2241 petition.5
In conclusion, Moore has failed to show that § 2255 is inadequate or
ineffective to consider his claims.  Thus, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider
the § 2241 habeas petition.  For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s
5December 8, 2005 order and remand so that the District Court can enter an order
dismissing the petition for lack of jurisdiction.  
